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# Message Text

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TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY CAIRO

S E C R E T STATE 084786

EXDIS, FOR AMBASSADOR FROM ATHERTON AND SAUNDERS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PEPR

SUBJECT: SHAH'S IDEAS ABOUT WEST BANK SOLUTION

REF: TEHRAN 3100

1. ON THEORETICAL PLANE THERE IS NOTHING INHERENTLY WRONG WITH SHAH'S IDEA FOR WEST BANK SETTLEMENT. AS YOU KNOW, PRESIDENT HAS SAID THAT WHILE SETTLEMENT FOR WEST BANK/GAZA MUST BE WORKED OUT IN NEGOTIATIONS AMONG PARTIES, WE OURSELVES DO NOT FAVOR CREATION OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE AND OUR PREFERENCE WOULD BE THAT EMERGENT PALESTINIAN ENTITY HAVE LINK WITH JORDAN.

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2. IN TERMS OF PRACTICAL NEGOTIATING POSSIBILITIES, SHAH'S FORMULA RUNS INTO TWO DIFFICULTIES. FIRST IS THAT UNDER PPESENT CIRCUMSTANCES ISRAELIS WILL NOT AGREE TO HAND OVER EITHER ALL, MOST OR PERHAPS ANY OF WEST BANK TO ANYONE. THIS POSITION IS PARTLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO BEGIN'S STRONGLY-HELD PERSONAL VIEWS ON WEST BANK, BUT ONLY PARTLY SO. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS ARE MAJOR FACTOR IN ISRAELI THINK-

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ING ABOUT FUTURE STATUS OF WEST BANK/GAZA, AND WE RECOGNIZE THAT FOR BOTH GEOGRAPHIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC REASONS ISRAELI SECURITY CONCERNS IN THESE RESPECTS HAVE CONSIDERABLE VALIDITY. WHILE LABOR ALIGNMENT, WHEN IT WAS IN POWER,

THOUGHT IN TERMS OF TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE, WITH PORTION OF WEST BANK TO BE RELINQUISHED TO GO TO JORDAN, PLAN THEY INFORMALLY PUT FORWARD (THE ALLON PLAN) ENVISAGED ISRAELI RETENTION OF MAJOR PORTIONS OF WEST BANK, AND IT WAS NEVER ACCEPTED BY KING HUSSEIN AS AN ADEQUATE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS.

3. SECOND PROBLEM HAS TO DO WITH JORDAN'S RELATIONS WITH PALESTINIANS AND OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS. SHAH WILL RECALL THAT 1974 ARAB SUMMIT IN RABAT DECLARED THE PLO TO BE "THE SOLE AND LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE" IN EFFECT STRIPPING KING HUSSEIN OF ANY MANDATE TO SPEAK FOR OR NEGOTIATE FOR THE PALESTINIANS. PALESTINIANS WOULD NOT TODAY ACCEPT PRE-DETERMINED NEGOTIATION WHICH PUT THEM, WITHOUT SOME MANNER OF CHOICE OR SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THEM, UNDER THE RULE OF JORDAN. IF PALESTINIANS DID NOT ACCEPT SUCH OUTCOME, NEITHER WOULD MOST ARAB STATES, AND IT IS ALMOST CERTAIN THAT HUSSEIN WOULD NOT GO FOR A DEAL THAT DID NOT COMMAND AT LEAST SOME SUPPORT FROM THOSE QUARTERS.

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4. BOTH OF THESE FACTORS--BUT IN PARTICULAR THE FIRST, VIZ. THAT TERRITORIAL DEAL SATISFACTORY TO BOTH SIDES IS NOT IN SIGHT AT PRESENT TIME--LEAD OUR THINKING IN DIRECTION OF TRYING TO GET THE PARTIES TO AGREE TO AN INTERIM REGIME WHICH WOULD GIVE INHABITANTS SUBSTANTIAL MEASURE OF SELF-RULE AND COMMIT PARTIES (INCLUDING PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES) TO NEGOTIATE BY END OF PERIOD TERMS FOR FINAL SETTLEMENT, INCLUDING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BORDER IN THIS AREA. FROM ISRAEL'S POINT OF VIEW SCHEME ALONG THOSE LINES WOULD HAVE SEVERAL ADVANTAGES: IT WOULD ALLOW ISRAEL TO MAINTAIN OVERALL SECURITY CONTROL OF AREA DURING INTERIM PERIOD; IT WOULD GIVE ISRAELIS PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE IN TERMS OF ARAB WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE IN SPHERE OF SECURITY AND OF POLITICAL EVOLUTION IN THESE TERRITORIES; AND ISRAEL WOULD NOT BE ASKED TO COMMIT ITSELF TO FINAL TERMS UNTIL AFTER THESE COMPONENTS, AS WELL AS EGYPT'S WILLINGNESS TO LIVE UP TO THE TERMS OF ITS PEACE AGREEMENT, HAD BEEN TESTED OVER A PERIOD OF TIME. FOR THE ARABS THE ADVANTAGE WOULD BE THAT THEY STAND TO GET A BETTER TERRITORIAL DEAL, AND MORE PARTICIPATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS IN THE DETERMINATION OF THEIR FUTURE, AT THE END OF SUCH AN

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INTERIM PERIOD THAN THEY DO NOW.

5. AS SHAH KNOWS, BEGIN HAS PUT FORWARD HIS OWN "SELF-RULE" PLAN FOR WEST BANK AND GAZA. WHILE IT CONTAINS NUMBER OF USEFUL ELEMENTS, IT FALLS SHORT ON SEVERAL IM-

PORTANT POINTS FROM OUR ESTIMATE OF MINIMUM REQUIRED TO DRAW ARABS INTO NEGOTIATIONS: IT DOES NOT COMMIT ISRAELIS TO NEGOTIATE FINAL SETTLEMENT INCLUDING ISRAELI WITH-DRAWAL AT END OF INTERIM PERIOD; AUTHORITY FOR REGIME WOULD REMAIN EXCLUSIVELY WITH ISRAEL RATHER THAN DERIVING FROM AGREEMENT AMONG THE PARTIES (WHICH WOULD INCLUDE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES); AND NOTHING IS SPECIFIED IN THE WAY OF MECHANISM BY WHICH PALESTINIANS, AT END OF

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INTERIM PERIOD, WOULD BE ABLE TO EXPRESS THEIR CONSENT TO TERMS WHICH HAD BEEN NEGOTIATED FOR FINAL SETTLEMENT. WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO PURSUADE ISRAELIS TO MODIFY THEIR PLAN TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THESE POINTS AS WELL AS NUMBER OF OTHER SUGGESTIONS WHICH WE BELIEVE WOULD MAKE PLAN MORE ATTRACTIVE TO ARABS. MOST IMPORTANT FEATURE FROM ARAB POINT OF VIEW WILL BE SOME FORM OF ISRAELI COMMITMENT TO PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL FROM THESE AREAS IN CONTEXT OF FINAL SETTLEMENT. THIS HAS BECOME ALL THE MORE IM-PORTANT WITH BEGIN'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS THAT ISRAEL IS FREE TO INTERPRET SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 AS NOT REPEAT NOT REQUIRING ANY ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM WEST BANK.

6. IN FOCUSING ON WEST BANK/GAZA/PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, OUR PURPOSE IS NOT TO PUT FORWARD DETAILED PLAN OF OUR OWN BUT TO DRAW BOTH ISRAEL AND ARAB PARTIES INTO THINKING CONCRETELY AND REALISTICALLY ABOUT THE SPECIAL PROBLEM THEY FACE IN COMING TO TERMS ON THIS ASPECT OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT. WE THINK BOTH SIDES ARE BEGINNING TO COME AROUND TO OUR CONCEPT THAT BUFFER OF TIME IS NEEDED IN ORDER TO WORK OUT FINAL ARRANGEMENT, AND THAT DURING THIS PERIOD POLITICAL PROCESS CAN BE SET IN MOTION THAT WOULD ENHANCE PROSPECTS FOR NEGOTIATION OF FINAL TERMS IN-VOLVING LINK WITH JORDAN. PROBLEM OF GETTING BOTH SIDES TO EMBARK ON EXPLORATION OF ISSUE IN CONCRETE TERMS IS COMPLICATED BY FACT THAT SADAT FEELS HE HAS NO MANDATE TO NEGOTIATE ON BEHALF OF PALESTINIANS IN WEST BANK, HUSSEIN FEELS UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT ENTERING NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT ISRAELI COMMITMENT TO ULTIMATE WITHDRAWAL FROM WEST BANK, AND ISRAELIS FEEL LITTLE COMPULSION TO COME FOR-WARD WITH MODIFICATIONS IN THEIR PLAN IN THE ABSENCE OF MORE ACTIVE ARAB PARTICIPATION.

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7. YOU MAY SHARE THESE THOUGHTS WITH THE SHAH. IN EX-
PLAINING OUR RESERVATIONS WITH HIS IDEA WE THINK IT BEST
TO DO SO IN TERMS OF THE FACTUAL ANALYSIS CONTAINED HEREIN
RATHER THAN SUGGESTING WE HAVE DIFFERENT PLAN OF OUR OWN.
CHRISTOPHER



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# Message Attributes

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